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Leadership Perceptions of Endgame Strategies for Tobacco Control in California

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4 **Abstract**
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7 Objective: To explore the perspectives of key stakeholders regarding advancement of the
8 tobacco endgame in California.
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11 Design: Interviews and focus groups exploring participants’ knowledge of the tobacco endgame
12 concept, their reactions to four endgame policy proposals (banning tobacco sales, registering
13 smokers, retailer reduction, and permanently prohibiting tobacco sales to all those born after a
14 certain year [“tobacco-free generation”]), and policy priorities and obstacles.
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22 Participants: Interviews with 11 California legislators/legislative staff, 6 leaders of national
23 tobacco control organizations, and 5 leaders of California-based organizations or California
24 subsidiaries of national organizations. Focus groups (7) with professional and volunteer tobacco
25 control advocates in Northern, Southern, and Central California.
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32 Results: Advocates were more familiar with the endgame concept than legislators or legislative
33 staff. All proposed endgame policies received both support and opposition, but smoker
34 registration and banning tobacco sales were the least popular, regarded as too stigmatizing or
35 too extreme. The tobacco free generation and retailer reduction policies received the most
36 support. Both were regarded as politically feasible given their focus on protecting youth or
37 regulating retailers and their gradual approach. Concerns raised about all the proposals
38 included the creation of black markets, and the potential for disparate impacts on
39 disadvantaged communities.
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53 Conclusions: Participants’ willingness to support novel tobacco control proposals suggests that
54 they understand the magnitude of the tobacco problem and have some appetite for innovation
55 despite concerns about specific endgame policies. A preference for more gradual approaches
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suggests that taking incremental steps toward an endgame policy goal may be the most effective strategy.

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4 **Introduction**
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7 For decades, tobacco was regarded as a problem of individual behavior. Public health
8
9 has now identified the tobacco industry as the vector of the epidemic,^{1,2} suggesting that
10
11 broader interventions are needed to achieve a tobacco “endgame.” Endgame proponents call
12
13 for moving beyond persistent tobacco *control* toward an explicit, time-delimited plan to achieve
14
15 a tobacco-free future.^{1,3-9} Various proposals to achieve an endgame have been advanced,
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17 including limits on retailers;¹⁰⁻¹⁴ prohibiting tobacco sales to anyone born after a certain
18
19 year;^{15,16} and prohibiting tobacco product sales.^{8,9,17}
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25 Among US states, California may be uniquely positioned to achieve a tobacco endgame,
26
27 due to state tobacco control program success in changing public views of tobacco and the
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29 tobacco industry,¹⁸ public support for stronger policies, and dedicated resources. Tobacco
30
31 control advances have frequently originated at the local level, but recently, with few local
32
33 precedents, the state legislature raised the minimum age of tobacco purchase from 18 to 21.¹⁹
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35 Understanding the perspectives of key stakeholders is essential for planning the tobacco
36
37 endgame in California; however, their views about endgame strategies have not been explored.
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39 Our research examined how California policymakers, tobacco control advocates and leaders of
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41 national and California-based tobacco control organizations view tobacco endgame strategies.
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48 **Methods**
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51 The study was approved by the University of California, San Francisco’s Committee on
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53 Human Research. We agreed to keep confidential participants’ names.
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55

56 *Recruitment*
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58 ***Legislators***
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4 Using purposive sampling, we identified 19 California state legislators (13 Assembly, 6
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7 Senate) who had been recent sponsors of tobacco control legislation. We contacted them by
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10 email to explain the study’s purpose and request an interview, making follow-up telephone
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12 calls to those who did not respond. If legislators declined the interview, we asked to speak to a
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14 legislative staff member with health policy expertise. We considered staff acceptable stand-ins,
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16 since they are involved in crafting policy, including researching, analyzing and summarizing
17
18 issues.²⁰ Offices of 11 legislators agreed to participate. We interviewed 4 legislators (3
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20 Assemblymembers, 1 Senator), and 7 legislative staff (6 focused on health policy, 1 on
21
22 communications; 6 Assembly, 1 Senate). Five legislators (and their staff) declined to participate
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24 (2 Assembly members, 3 Senators), two legislators recommended contacting legislative staff
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26 who failed to respond to repeated emails and calls, and one legislator did not respond.
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Leadership of tobacco control organizations

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35 Drawing on personal knowledge and past research,²¹ we identified a purposive sample
36
37 of 15 national tobacco control and health voluntary organizations and networks with a stated
38
39 interest in tobacco control. Eight were focused on minority populations. The first author
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41 attempted to telephone leaders (president, vice president, or director) of all organizations;
42
43 however, 3 (all focused on minority populations) were inactive and neither past leaders nor
44
45 successor organizations could be located. Among remaining organizations, after being informed
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47 of the nature of the study, 11 agreed to to telephone interviews; 1 declined. Of the 11, 5 were
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49 California-based.
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Volunteer and professional California tobacco control advocates

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4 To obtain the views of local volunteer and professional California tobacco control
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7 advocates, we conducted seven focus groups, four in Northern California (2 in San Francisco, 1
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9 in San Mateo, and 1 in Oakland), two in Southern California (Los Angeles), and one in Central
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11 California (Bakersfield). We recruited participants using the authors' and colleagues'
12
13 professional networks, augmented by a "snowball" approach, in which professional advocates
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15 recruited others (professional or volunteer) active with their organizations.
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19 *Procedures*

20 *Interviews*

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25 Recorded telephone interview (20-60 minutes long) were conducted with legislators (or
26
27 staff) and leaders, using a standardized interview guide. All three authors conducted at least
28
29 one interview. Questions explored participants' knowledge of the tobacco endgame concept,
30
31 their reactions to four endgame policy proposals (table 1), their thoughts on how to prioritize
32
33 them, and likely obstacles to implementation. Interviews took place from January-April 2017.
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38 *Focus groups*

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40 Focus groups were conducted by EAS and PAM with California advocates. In each group,
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42 after informed consent and demographic data were obtained (see Table, Supplemental Digital
43
44 Content 1, available at: TBD, for demographic data), the four endgame policies (table 1) were
45
46 described to participants. Written "ballots" asked how likely participants would be to vote for
47
48 each proposal if it were on the California ballot. Participants were asked to discuss their
49
50 thoughts about the proposals. After discussion, participants were again given "ballots" gauging
51
52 their support for each proposal. Participants received a \$40 gift card for participation. Focus
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54 groups were conducted from May 2016-March 2017.
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4 *Analysis*
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7 Recorded interviews and focus group discussions were professionally transcribed. We
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9 used the software package NVivo9 for data management, and analyzed data qualitatively by
10 coding for recurrent themes and iteratively reviewing clusters of coded text. “Ballot” results
11
12 were tabulated and categories collapsed (e.g., “definitely yes” and “probably yes” combined).
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14 Because legislators and staff had very different levels of knowledge about and approaches to
15 tobacco control policy development, we analyzed their interviews separately; leaders
16
17 (interviews) and advocates (focus groups) were analyzed together.
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25 **Results**
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27 *Legislators/staff*
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30 ***Endgame concept/proposals***
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33 Most legislators and legislative staff were unfamiliar with the endgame term. Each
34 proposal received some support, but the tobacco sales ban was least popular, rejected as too
35 extreme or politically unfeasible. For example, one legislator stated: “I think people look at
36 [alcohol] Prohibition and they go, ‘Well, that was a failure.’...People [will] be smuggling
37 [tobacco], etc., and...it could become a locus for crime.” The smoker registration proposal was
38 also unpopular, regarded as too “Big Brother-ish,” particularly in the current political climate.
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48 ***Priorities***
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51 The tobacco-free generation (TFG) and retailer reduction proposals were most often
52 identified as likely priorities for California. TFG was appealing because it drew easily defensible
53 distinctions between current and future smokers. It did not “take something away” from
54 current smokers; instead, “it’s focused on young people who haven’t started yet and will never
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4 know the difference.” Those who supported retailer reduction saw it as the most feasible or
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6
7 “least controversial” of the proposals, since it would be less obtrusive than smoker registration
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10 and more gradual than a sales ban, giving people time to “adapt” and find “other ways to
11
12 access tobacco” or “stay away from it altogether.” One suggestion was to add a component to
13
14 eliminate the over-saturation of tobacco retailer licenses in particular (i.e., low income)
15
16
17 neighborhoods.

18 19 20 ***Obstacles***

21
22 Legislators and staff identified several obstacles to enacting the proposals, including the
23
24 political clout of the tobacco industry. Tobacco manufacturers would “mobilize people in the
25
26 community using their money” to “push back” on any of these proposals. Tobacco retailers
27
28 were reliable opponents of bills they perceived to threaten their livelihoods. Some legislators
29
30 and staff also believed that recent tobacco control legislation (five laws passed in 2016) would
31
32 dampen enthusiasm for additional measures. However, one staffer argued that those successes
33
34 created “an opportunity....[I]f we already took these steps, then we can definitely move
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36 forward.”
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43 ***Local versus state action***

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45 All interviewees agreed that the legislature would be likelier to act on an endgame
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47 proposal if similar policies passed at local levels first; however, they also agreed that the state
48
49 took the initiative to raise the tobacco purchase age to 21 (as only four localities had introduced
50
51 this measure). Staffers explained that California liked to show leadership, particularly compared
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53 to other states. One noted: “We take care of our constituents in a way that other [states]
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4 don't," while another said that other state legislatures sometimes called for policy advice,
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7 "because the nation turns to California."
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10 *Advocates (focus groups)*

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12 **Ballots**

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15 Table 2 indicates how likely focus group participants indicated they would be to vote for
16
17 each proposal if it were on the California ballot, both before and after discussion. Smoker
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19 registration and banning tobacco sales received the most "no" votes, with support declining
20
21 slightly after discussion, while TFG and retailer reduction received the most "yes" votes, with
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23 support increasing slightly after discussion.
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27 *Advocates (focus groups) and leaders (interviews)*

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30 **Heard of endgame**

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33 Participants were asked whether they had heard of the tobacco endgame concept. In 3
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35 focus groups, most had not; in the other 4, most had. Participants in Los Angeles focus groups
36
37 equated the concept with the TFG proposal. Others spoke more generally, saying the endgame
38
39 meant "to prevent people from smoking, or stop selling tobacco, period," or to "eventually
40
41 [get] to no one smoking." Among interviewees, all had heard of the endgame idea, and some
42
43 had seriously engaged with it. For example, one leader reported participating in endgame
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45 discussions with thought leaders, reading endgame-related material in the Surgeon General's
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47 report,²² and having organizational conversations. Participants also observed that the idea
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49 meant different things to different people.
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58 There was also variation in attitudes toward the endgame idea. One advocate
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60 commented, "Until there is the political will to put the tobacco industry really in its place,
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4 then...this is just another pie in the sky.” Others found the concept inspiring, calling it a “good
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7 goal.” One said, “just hearing the words ‘end game’ made me start thinking...that’s what we
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10 need to be talking to people about.”

11 ***Smoker registration: approach***

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14 Smoker registration was the least popular proposal. Participants described it as
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16
17 “criminalizing,” “villainizing,” “stigmatiz[ing]” or “demoniz[ing]” smokers. One participant
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19
20 objected that it would make it difficult for sick smokers to sue tobacco companies, who could
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23 argue that they were not liable because “you [smoker] clearly knew exactly how hazardous the
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26 products were because you signed on and agreed to get [a smoker’s] license.” Another
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29 suggested that, far from “criminalizing” smokers, the policy meant the state was “formally
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32 sanctioning certain people smoking,” calling this “a pretty untenable position.”

33 ***Smoker registration: impact***

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35
36 Numerous participants suggested that making smokers register might serve to more
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38
39 firmly establish their identities as smokers, inhibiting quitting. Black markets were also
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41
42 perceived to be a downside. Numerous participants thought some people would get a license
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44
45 just to illicitly resell tobacco. Participants noted that the proposal wouldn’t affect the problem
46
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48 of second- and third-hand smoke.

49 ***Ban tobacco sales: approach***

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52 Some advocates thought banning tobacco sales could be popular with the public.
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55 “People do say, ‘If it’s that bad, it should be illegal,’” one participant said, suggesting a media
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57
58 campaign that asked, “why is it a crazy idea to...ban the sale of tobacco?” Another thought it
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61 was “like banning the industry....I think that people could rally around that.” However, most
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4 participants were more skeptical. A leader recalled examples “where a community...moved too
5
6 quickly...and got a lot of backlash.” That could “set us back on all of the other policy fronts.”
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8
9 Many participants predicted that banning sales would encounter powerful opposition. Some
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11 said tobacco companies would take legal action, while others thought the proposal conflicted
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13 with American values and would inspire opposition against the “nanny state, overregulation,
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15 big government, etc.”
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19 ***Ban tobacco sales: impact***

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22 Only a few participants predicted any positive results from prohibiting sales. One said,
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24 “You would dramatically change the landscape because if you can’t legally sell a product, you
25
26 can’t advertise [it].” The most common objection to banning sales was that it would inevitably
27
28 lead to black markets, with cigarettes becoming “an illegal drug. Then they’ll start having to
29
30 traffic it and bring it from other countries.” This scenario made lack of penalties for possession
31
32 problematic for some, as there was no disincentive not to try to buy cigarettes elsewhere.
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34 Some invoked the history of U.S. alcohol prohibition: “Banning sales is...a prohibition approach,
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36 which I just don’t think is effective.”
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43 ***TFG: Approach***

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45 Participants described TFG as politically “palatable,” “marketable,” and “doable.” Much
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47 of this enthusiasm came from its youth focus, emphasizing prevention rather than behavior
48
49 change. As one participant explained, “the easiest way to change behavior is to not to have to.”
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51 Others recalled that raising the age of tobacco purchase to 21 was possible because there was
52
53 less “pushback” from youth, either because they couldn’t vote or because there were fewer
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55 younger smokers. One participant saw the proposal as aimed at the tobacco industry: “[It]
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4 makes me very happy to think of [the industry] saying, ‘How dare you take away the right of a
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7 14-year-old to...buy [tobacco]!’”
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10 Other participants found it problematic that there would be some adults who could
11 purchase tobacco and others who could not. For example, one described the “biggest
12 challenge” to the proposal as the different set of rights that accrued to people who are
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14 separated by only “days, in terms of their birthdates.” Another anticipated “this nanny state
15 criticism [that]...the industry would jump on.” Some expressed concern that enforcement might
16
17 center on purchasers rather than retailers.
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24 25 ***TFG: impact*** 26

27 The major objection to the TFG proposal was the continued legal availability of tobacco
28 products. Participants predicted that the supposedly tobacco-free generation would acquire
29
30 cigarettes from “older sibs.” This familial link could perpetuate inequities with “some kids...still
31
32 smoking because...people in their households smoked.” Families in demographics with low
33
34 tobacco use prevalence would see that behavior reinforced, while tobacco use would be further
35
36 concentrated among others, exacerbating health disparities.
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43 Some participants foresaw resistance, with young people rebelling against being “told
44
45 what to do,” particularly because youth were “notorious” for wanting to do “even more” the
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47 activities they were prohibited from doing. However, others anticipated a cultural shift, with
48
49 young people thinking “We're cool. We don't want to be like the older generation...They all
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51 smoke.”
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56 ***Retailer reduction: focus*** 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

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4 Participants saw retailer reduction as “the most politically viable” proposal, one that
5
6 went “to the root cause of the problem.” The 10-year time frame was also a plus. Retailer
7
8 reduction would work well with outlet density restrictions and retailer caps, and “Just limiting
9
10 the availability” was “less intrusive on people's rights.” Many suggested modifications such as
11
12 selling tobacco in tobacco- or adult-only stores. One concern raised by several participants was
13
14 that retailer reduction be equitable, beginning with “those communities that are hardest hit,
15
16 most concentrated with tobacco permits... have the most advertising.”
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22 Focusing on sellers was appealing: “You're going after the person who's selling the
23
24 products versus the person who's addicted.” However, one leader pointed out that “retailers
25
26 are...the strongest, most effective opponents of tobacco control measures.” Some participants
27
28 sympathized with retailers. One thought retailers might be “entitled to some compensation”
29
30 for lost business. Others disagreed, arguing that it was a “privilege” for retailers to sell tobacco;
31
32 using “economic principles” to underscore “that we are not giving tacit approval for them to do
33
34 it forever” was a good strategy.
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40 ***Retailer reduction: impact***

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43 Some participants thought retailer reduction would result in reduced consumption.
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45 Several noted the inconvenience it imposed, with tobacco no longer available “on every
46
47 corner.” Youth might be particularly affected, as they “will be less likely to be able to go two or
48
49 three miles” for cigarettes. Reducing retailers would also affect community norms about
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51 tobacco use and reduce enforcement costs.
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56 Other participants were unconvinced. One participant predicted that making purchase
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58 less convenient would cause smokers to buy cartons rather than single packs of cigarettes,
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4 potentially increasing the number of cigarettes smoked. As with other proposals, numerous
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6
7 participants believed that retailer reduction would result in black markets. This, in turn, could
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10 have disparate impacts, with “priority populations” suffering most.

11 *Leaders (interviews only)*

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14 ***Priorities***

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17 Leaders were asked what endgame approaches should be California priorities. Of the
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19
20 policies presented, retailer reduction was mentioned as the first step: after it was
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22
23 implemented, “maybe we can think about banning tobacco.” Another popular policy option
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25
26 “that could be done tomorrow” was banning menthol. Combining approaches was also
27
28 possible: “Combine the tobacco free generation [with] the [tobacco] 21, and you can only get
29
30 mentholated tobacco products at [adults only] establishments. Now you’ve got a state that’s
31
32 going to easily see youth initiation decline.”

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35 ***Organizational role***

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38 Almost all participants saw a role for their organizations in planning an endgame, even
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40
41 those who disliked the ideas presented. The two most critical of endgame discussions were
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43
44 concerned about impacts on their communities, and suggested that their organizations’ input
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46
47 could minimize this. One said his group’s role should be “to educate about what works in
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49
50 reducing tobacco disparities and what can potentially harm communities.” Some advocates
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52
53 stressed that their organizations should be involved in the development of new policy
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56 directions: “We want to be...part of the discussion and part of determining whether it’s smart
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59 to move forward or not.” Some representatives of national groups thought their central offices
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61
62 might not be as enthusiastic as they were about endgame activities. One advocate commented
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4 that the national organization thought, “it’s a little bit premature.” But another thought they
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6
7 “would definitely be supportive.”
8

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10 ***Conflict with/complement other priorities***

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12 Several respondents were concerned that focus on endgame strategies would conflict
13
14 with their organizational priorities. Some did not think the proposed strategies were taking on
15
16 the right target. One said, “It’s really trying to eliminate access to tobacco....And that...is not
17
18 going to address the issue,” which was to reduce the inequities that led to tobacco use. Others
19
20 thought focusing on known approaches was a better way to proceed. Some worried that
21
22 focusing on endgame proposals might leave behind communities that were already trailing in
23
24 tobacco control advances.
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29
30 Other participants asserted that endgame ideas could complement their current
31
32 priorities: “We only have so much effort. Why not have that same amount of effort going
33
34 towards moon shots?” Others were more specific. Retailer reduction “is a priority already,”
35
36 noted one leader. Another also mentioned specific policies: “Increasing the purchasing age is
37
38 something that’s definitely on our policy agenda....[TFG] is one that...organizations like ours I
39
40 think would take a serious look at [and] limiting the number of retailers.”
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46 ***Priority populations***

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48 Several respondents emphasized that endgame approaches should be chosen with the
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50 participation of priority populations. “What’s really important,” noted one, “is to really begin to
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52 engage other folks that are impacted by commercial tobacco...and those include communities
53
54 of color. It includes LGBT communities. It includes other priority populations.” Another
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56 highlighted “the mental health community, the prison population, the military population,”
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4 stressing that “we maybe need to figure out a little bit more strategy for dealing with those
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7 populations” because “we’re not going to get to zero unless we’re actually really
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10 addressing...the reasons why they’re still smoking.” She continued that without this work, “talk
11
12 about endgame is maybe premature....[W]e can’t just ram it down their throats.”
13

14 **California**

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16
17 California was regarded as a good place to attempt an endgame strategy. “It’s definitely
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19
20 within reach in California,” said one participant. “[Tobacco control success in 2016] puts
21
22 California as a leader.” However, others warned of being overconfident: “If we don’t have
23
24 the...ability to get California to raise its tax by another \$2.00 [beyond the recent \$2.00
25
26 increase], why is it we think that the California legislature will prohibit sales of cigarettes to
27
28 anybody born after the year 2000?”
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32 **Discussion**

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35 While a variety of opinions about endgame proposals were expressed by participants,
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38 and all proposals had supporters and opponents, in interviews with legislators and balloting
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40
41 among advocates, TFG and retailer reduction received the most support. This did not
42
43 necessarily indicate that participants fully endorsed these policies. In focus groups, for example,
44
45 there was lively debate about the potential drawbacks and pitfalls of both proposals. Yet
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48 individuals who raised criticisms or saw problematic aspects of these proposal were still willing
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51 to “vote” for them. This may suggest that advocates perceived a need for new approaches to
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53 tobacco control, even if they did not appear to be ideal. A broader public, not as concerned
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56 about tobacco, and voting in a real-world situation, would likely not be so forgiving. The
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4 criticisms raised by participants suggest some potential approaches and pitfalls for advocates
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7 who want to advance endgame policies.
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9
10 One of the problems that all types of respondents foresaw for all approaches was the
11
12 development of black markets. These were seen as problematic and inevitable if cigarettes
13
14 ceased to be widely available. The idea of black markets would also likely be exploited by
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16
17 opponents of endgame policies, including the tobacco industry. Some response to this fear will
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20 be necessary for the advancement of any endgame approach.
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23 A second, related, theme was social justice. There was concern that enforcement of the
24
25 smoker's license, and to a lesser degree TFG, would focus on smokers. This led to fears of over-
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28 policing, particularly of marginalized populations, with officers using "smoking without a
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31 license" or similar violations as an excuse to surveil and harass people. (The predicted black
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34 markets were also perceived to both disproportionately impact these communities, and to
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37 create likely targets for policing.) To overcome this fear, any attempt at policies such as these
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40 should present them as retailer-focused.

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42 Another social justice issue was how and in what ways implementation of such policies
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45 might affect marginalized populations. Some participants felt that TFG might further
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48 concentrate tobacco use among populations who currently have high prevalence rates, by
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51 giving young people continued access to cigarettes through family and friends. Others pointed
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54 out the necessity of implementing a retailer reduction scheme equitably, so that as fewer
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57 retailers were permitted they were not concentrated in particular communities.

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59 A third theme was a preference for more gradual policies. Both retailer reduction
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62 (posited to take 10 years) and TFG (allowing current legal smokers to continue indefinitely)
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4 were perceived as more feasible than policies that would abruptly change the availability of
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6 tobacco. These gradual approaches have the downside of continuing to permit tobacco use,
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8 which some advocates also pointed out. However, it may be easier to gain support for them if a
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10 long lead time makes them appear more moderate.
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14 The preference for gradual policies suggests that advocating that localities (or the state)
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16 take incremental steps toward an endgame policy goal may be the most effective strategy to
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18 achieve an endgame. For example, if the goal were achieving an endgame through retailer
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20 reduction, interim steps might include reducing retailers through buffer zones, eliminating
21
22 retailer types (e.g., pharmacies), and retailer caps. As these incremental policies are
23
24 implemented, social expectations about where or whether tobacco should be sold or should be
25
26 used may change, much as public support for smokefree laws tends to increase after their
27
28 passage.²³⁻²⁷ A history of successful policy implementation and changing norms may, in turn, lay
29
30 the groundwork for additional (or less gradual) endgame-oriented policy changes. This positive
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32 feedback process may support endgame approaches even in jurisdictions lacking California's
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34 strong history of tobacco control.
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42 *Limitations*

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44 This was a qualitative, exploratory study, whose small sample size, while consistent with
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46 our exploratory aims, limits our ability to generalize our findings to the entire California
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48 legislature, or to all tobacco control advocates or leaders. The opinions expressed may also be
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50 preliminary, given that the endgame ideas discussed were often new to participants and not
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52 the subject of widespread media or public attention. Such initial insights are valuable, however,
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54 from a group familiar with state and local tobacco control policymaking.
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4 **Implications for policy and practice**
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7 • The fact that all four endgame proposals received some support suggests that the
8 magnitude of the tobacco problem and the need for innovative policy solutions to
9 address it are well understood.
10
- 11 • As discussions about an “endgame” proceed, it will be important to include the
12 perspectives of priority populations, and to define a believably achievable endpoint.
13
- 14 • Advocating that localities (or the state) take incremental steps toward an endgame
15 policy goal may be the most effective strategy.
16
- 17 • Seeing such incremental policies as steps toward a longer-term endgame goal could
18 energize advocates, keep coalitions focused on policy improvements, and enhance the
19 “policy competition” environment, whereby states and counties attempt to lead or keep
20 up with the policy developments of their neighbors.
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Table 1. Endgame policy proposals presented

Endgame proposal	Description
A. Banning tobacco sales	The state would ban the sale of cigarettes. There would be no penalty for possessing cigarettes or smoking them.
B. Smoker registration	In order to smoke legally, people would have to be of smoking age, pass a test about the dangers of smoking, and pay a fee. Smokers would receive a “smart card” that would let them buy a certain number of cigarettes per week (users could choose the amount up to a maximum; higher amounts would cost more than lower amounts). Smokers would buy cigarettes from authorized stores. Smokers could reduce their weekly amount (if they wanted to cut down), or give up their registration (if they quit). Upon giving up their registration, ex-smokers would get back all fees.
C. Reducing the number of tobacco retailers	The state gives stores a license to sell cigarettes. Now, there is no limit on the number of licenses. In this proposal, the number of licenses available would be reduced each year, with available licenses to be distributed by lottery. In 10 years, the state would stop providing licenses altogether.
D. Tobacco-free generation	Sales of cigarettes would be barred to those born after 2000. Current smokers would continue to be able to buy cigarettes but those born after 2000 would never be able to legally buy them. Smoking would be “aged out.”

Table 2: Votes on four endgame proposals by focus group participants (N=44)

	Pre-discussion			Post-Discussion		
	Definitely/ Probably Yes	Definitely/ Probably No	No data/ Don't know	Definitely/ Probably Yes	Definitely/ Probably No	No data/ Don't know
Smoker registration	25	15	4	22	20	2
Ban sales	29	12	3	27	14	3
Tobacco-free generation	32	6	6	34	6	4
Retailer reduction	40	3	1	43	0	1

Supplemental Digital Content 1: Characteristics of focus group participants (N=44)

		N	%
Gender			
	Male	21	47.7
	Female	23	52.3
Race			
	American Indian/Alaska Native	2	4.5
	Asian	5	11.4
	Native Hawaiian/PI	1	2.3
	Black/African American	13	29.5
	White	11	25.0
	More than one	6	13.6
	No data	6	13.6
Ethnicity			
	Hispanic/Latino	9	20.5
	Not Hispanic/Latino	32	72.7
	No data	3	6.8
Tobacco use			
	Use tobacco now	2	4.5
	Use tobacco ever	19	43.2
	Use e-cigarettes now	2	4.5
	Use e-cigarettes ever	7	15.9